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INTRODUCTION

Should individuals be allowed to waive fiduciary duties in a limited liability
company (LLC)? Why do these fiduciary duties matter? These questions
pervade scholar’s discussions when looking to improve a state’s LLC
provisions. Many states permit the contractual alteration and elimination of
fiduciary duties in an LLC through waiver.1 However, many states fail to
provide clear default fiduciary duties owed by members or managers of the
LLC, nor do they provide a clear upholding of waived duties.2 Without a clearly
articulated waiver policy3 and list of default duties, members and potential

1. See H. Justin Pace, Contracting Out of Fiduciary Duties in LLCs: Delaware Will Lead, But
Will Anyone Follow?, 16 NEV. L.J. 1085, 1092 (2016).
2. See id. at 1094–95.
3. For a discussion of the alteration and elimination (waiver) of fiduciary duties, see infra Section
III.B.1.
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investors may experience higher transaction costs upon LLC formation and shy
away from forming an LLC in that state.4 Allowing such issues to persist
directly contradicts the policy behind LLC formation. As one scholar stated,
“[T]he overall social policy goal of business entity governance [is] to foster
investor confidence while keeping transaction costs at a minimum.”5 Thus, a
state’s LLC statute and related provisions should reflect this sentiment.
Since Wisconsin’s adoption of the LLC in 19946 little discussion has
occurred regarding the default fiduciary duties members owe to the LLC and
each other.7 Such lack of discussion leaves Wisconsin courts, attorneys,
members of the LLC, and third parties to guess at the baseline fiduciary duties
owed by members and managers. This topic must be tackled because the
Wisconsin LLC statute ambiguously lists the default duties.8 The ambiguity in
the current statute and lack of discussion leaves scholars debating whether
common law fiduciary duties are owed if not contractually altered in the
operating agreement.9
Wisconsin courts waver on their implementation of the “common law”
fiduciary duties to members of an LLC, creating great uncertainty for members,
managers, and investors in LLCs.10 The only certainty that parties in Wisconsin
rely on is that fiduciary duties may be altered or waived by the contractual
language of the operating agreement.11 However, this waiver of fiduciary
duties has not yet been upheld by Wisconsin courts,12 creating many issues as
parties are uncertain if their waiver will be enforced.

4. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The “New” Fiduciary Standards Under the Revised Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act: More Bottom Bumping from NCCUSL, 61 ME. L. REV. 27, 30 (2009);
see also Sandra K. Miller, The Best of Both Worlds: Default Fiduciary Duties and Contractual
Freedom in Alternative Business Entities, 39 J. CORP. L. 295, 316 (2014).
5. Pace, supra note 1, at 1087 (alteration in original) (quoting Sandra K. Miller, The Duty of
Care in the LLC: Maintaining Accountability While Minimizing Judicial Interference, 87 NEB. L. REV .
125, 170–71 (2008)).
6. Zachary R. Willenbrink, LLCs: Exempt from Common-Law Fiduciary Duties?, WIS. LAW.,
Nov. 2012, at 29.
7. Id. at 27.
8. WIS. STAT. § 183.0402 (2015–2016).
9. See generally Willenbrink, supra note 6, at 28–29.
10. See generally Exec. Ctr. III, L.L.C. v. Meieran, 823 F. Supp. 2d 883 (E.D. Wis. 2011);
Gottsacker v. Monnier, 2005 WI 69, 281 Wis. 2d 361, 697 N.W.2d 436.
11. Kasten v. Doral Dental USA L.L.C., 2007 WI 76, ¶ 24, 301 Wis. 2d 598, 733 N.W.2d 300
(quoting JOSEPH W. BOUCHER ET AL., LLCS AND LLPS: A WISCONSIN HANDBOOK § 1.11 (rev. ed.
1999)).
12. Pace, supra note 1, at 1112 & n.227.
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Part II of this Comment examines the national rise of LLCs. Additionally,
it explores the purpose of fiduciary duties as well as why they apply to certain
individuals. This discussion puts into perspective the need to revise
Wisconsin’s current LLC Act or enact a new LLC statute. Part III looks at the
two most popular LLC regulatory methods, the Revised Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act (RULLCA) and the Delaware method. Critiquing and
examining these methods allows one to find the best practices to apply in
Wisconsin. In addition, this part examines Wisconsin’s current LLC Act and
the surrounding provisions, noting significant gaps in the current provisions.
Part IV provides how Wisconsin can fill the gaps in its LLC provisions by
enacting a new LLC statute that explicitly creates the default fiduciary duties
of loyalty and care, but allows for the contractual waiver of these duties. The
benefits derived from enacting this statute will increase investment in LLCs or
promote additional LLC formations by fostering member and investor
confidence.
II. EXPLORING THE HISTORY OF LLCS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES
The LLC is a relatively new business entity that was first established in
Wyoming in 1977.13 Wyoming’s legislature created this statutory entity “to
encourage investment and to attract business and investment from outside the
state of its organization.”14 To embody these attributes, the LLC drafters
focused on providing freedom from cumbersome corporate taxation, while
providing the limited liability protection found in corporations.15 This was the
start of a revolution in business organization law that forever reshaped the
landscape of business formations.
A. Formation and Structures of LLCs
LLCs are a hybrid business entity, combining the single-level flow-through
taxation and flexibility of a partnership with the limited liability ownership
concept found in corporations.16 Providing single-level flow-through taxation
incentivizes investment in the entity, because the LLC’s profits will be taxed
13. See Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537; Thomas
Earl Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (Part One), 37
S.D. L. REV. 44, 45 (1991).
14. Geu, supra note 13, at 50.
15. Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager After More Than
a Decade of Experimentation?, 32 J. CORP. L. 565, 567 (2007).
16. Edward J. Roche, Jr. et al., Limited Liability Companies Offer Pass-Through Benefits
Without S Corp. Restrictions, 74 J. TAX’N 248, 248 (1991).
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solely at the individual level, not at both the individual and entity level like a
corporation’s profits.17 Similarly, the limited liability of ownership, plucked
from corporate law, severs the traditional partnership concept of “joint and
several” liability between members or managers of the business.18 Limited
liability shields these individuals from the debts and obligations of the
company, allowing members or managers to protect their personal assets in the
event of bankruptcy or litigation.19 Perhaps the single most valuable aspect of
an LLC is its flexibility as an entity. An LLC allows members to “creatively
structure profits, losses, allocations and distributions, and many other elements
of their relationship in ways that are unavailable to some other entity forms.”20
LLCs offer an attractive formula by decreasing taxation, mitigating the risks
assumed by members, and allowing the greatest flexibility within the
organization, making LLCs a nationally popular business formation.21
LLCs are statutory entities, and each state provides a unique statutory
provision for the creation of an LLC within its borders.22 Each governing
statute offers two different categories of provisions: mandatory provisions and
default provisions.23 Mandatory provisions cannot be contractually altered in
the operating agreement.24 Alternatively, default provisions only apply when
the operating agreement doesn’t contain a conflicting provision or no operating
agreement exists.25 Mandatory and default provisions often include fiduciary
duties that are owed to other members or managers of the LLC, or to the LLC
itself.26

17. See Geu, supra note 13, at 45; see also Jay E. Grenig, 2 WIS. LEGAL F ORMS § 13:31 (2018)
(“The chief advantage of [pass-through taxation] is avoidance of double taxation of the earnings . . . .”).
18. Geu, supra note 13, at 50–51.
19. See id. at 52–54. However, in certain circumstances, courts may “pierce the veil” of limited
liability. See id. at 52 n.55 (providing examples of when courts have pierced the corporate veil of
limited liability).
20. Laurie A Ronholdt & Alex Pederson, Tips for Drafting and Issues Presented by LLC
Operating Agreements, PRAC. TAX LAW., Fall 2008, at 7.
21. See Jay W. Eisenhofer & Caitlin M. Moyna, What Is the State of Delaware Law as It Relates
to the Scope of Fiduciary Duties Owed to Investors in So-Called Alternative Entities? (Part 1),
BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 2, 2015), https://www.bna.com/state-delaware-law-n17179921815/
[https://perma.cc/85MM-DNRP] (stating that growth in alternative entity investments has tripled that
of traditional investments from 2005–2012); see also Miller, supra note 15, at 567.
22. Ronholdt & Pederson, supra note 20, at 7–8.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
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Every state statute requires filing a general document¾called the “articles
of organization”¾to form an LLC.27 This document provides basic
information such as the name of the entity, the address of the registered office,
the agents’ addresses, and whether the LLC will be member-managed or
manager-managed.28 In member-managed LLCs, the members can appoint
managing members, but if none are appointed, then each member is considered
an agent of the LLC.29 Generally, members in a manager-managed LLC do not
owe fiduciary duties to either the LLC or to other members.30 Managermanaged LLCs, however, require a much more structured approach, with the
duties defined in either an operating agreement or enacted in a set of bylaws.31
The decision of how the entity will be managed is an important distinction
because different duties may be owed by managers and members in a managermanaged LLC.32 The duties for either management structure shall be defined
in the operating agreement.33
While LLCs are statutorily created entities, they are often subject to
contractual alteration through the operating agreement.34 The operating
agreement lists information about the operating affairs and business conduct of
members or managers in the LLC.35 The operating agreement also governs
LLC members’ relationships to each other and the LLC, which includes
fiduciary duties.36 Operating agreements only operate inside the allowable
scope of the governing statute; thus, the operating agreement may alter default
provisions, but not mandatory provisions.37 Additionally, through the
governing statute the operating agreement may allow for increasing,
decreasing, or even eliminating fiduciary duties.38 Overall, the operating
agreement provides the flexibility desired in an LLC by allowing members to
clearly set expectations and define duties owed.
27. Geu, supra note 13, at 56.
28. Id.
29. Ronholdt & Pederson, supra note 20, at 11.
30. J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: A
STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 8:7 (2017).
31. Ronholdt & Pederson, supra note 20, at 11.
32. See id. at 12.
33. Id. at 11.
34. See Pace, supra note 1, at 1086.
35. See Ronholdt & Pederson, supra note 20, at 7.
36. CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND
BUSINESS LAW ¶ 5.06 (2018).
37. Id. ¶ 5.06[2][a][i].
38. Id. ¶ 5.06[2][d][i].
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B. Overview of Fiduciary Duties
Most LLC statutes contain provisions outlining members’ and managers’
fiduciary obligations to each other and the LLC.39 But before delving into what
these provisions obligate parties to do, one must first understand what fiduciary
duties are, as well as the purpose of fiduciary duties. To accomplish this task,
the following discussion will touch on fiduciary duties in the context of both
corporations and LLCs.
Fiduciary duties are obligations owed to a beneficiary due to the
vulnerability of their position.40 It is this vulnerability that creates a fiduciary
relationship, which in turn imposes fiduciary duties upon individuals entrusted
with decision-making power.41 An example of this relationship exists between
managers and shareholders in a corporation. The managers owe fiduciary
duties to the shareholders because the manager is in a position of power over
the shareholders, who wield little day-to-day decision-making power in the
corporation.42 If fiduciary duties were not imposed in this instance, managers
could derive personal profit from the company while not serving the
shareholders’ best interests.43
Additionally, fiduciary duties function “as a response to the impossibility
of contracting for all [future] contingencies due to limited information and high
transaction costs.”44 Not all problems are foreseeable when starting a company,
and contractually eliminating all the potential problems proves time intensive
and costly for parties.45 Thus, fiduciary duties plug the holes that arise in
contracts, particularly for items that were not explicitly contracted for.46
Further, fiduciary duties help determine what the parties would have agreed to
had they actually negotiated the terms.47 Without fiduciary duties, parties are
left contracting for all duties, and beneficiaries may not be able to trust the
actions of members or managers of the LLC.48 This trust is instrumental in

39. CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 30.
40. Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 240–41 (2009).
41. Id. at 244–45.
42. Id. at 245.
43. See id. at 241.
44. Pace, supra note 1, at 1086.
45. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 425, 426–27 (1993).
46. Alces, supra note 40, at 242.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 245.
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attracting funding from beneficiaries.49 Additionally, fiduciary duties may be
contractually imposed even when no fiduciary relationship exists,50 often
through an LLC’s operating agreement.51 Implementing fiduciary duties on
individuals allows those individuals entrusted with power to make flexible
decisions, address unpredictable problems, and protect beneficiaries’ interests
without incurring high contracting costs.52 However, if parties are not allowed
to contractually alter fiduciary duties, they may experience higher costs as
well.53
Two fiduciary duties are often implemented within companies¾the duties
of loyalty and care.54 The most impactful of the fiduciary duties is the duty of
loyalty. The duty of loyalty generally provides that fiduciaries may not engage
in self-dealing or be motivated by their own self-interest in their work for the
company.55 It is vital that managers or owners work toward benefitting the
entity and not enriching themselves at the expense of the business. If managers
could enrich themselves, companies would cease to serve the best interests of
the beneficiaries,56 creating a public harm. The second fiduciary duty, the duty
of care, provides that fiduciaries must reasonably inform themselves regarding
business decisions and must monitor the entity.57 This is not a high standard,
as parties must only act reasonably to fulfill their duty.58 Together, these
fiduciary duties provide security for beneficiaries absent a contractual
agreement.
While lower taxes, flexibility, and limited liability draw individuals toward
forming LLCs,59 uncertainty regarding whether fiduciary duties exist may
dissuade potential members.60 Since LLCs are statutorily created, fiduciary

49. See Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1079 (2017).
50. See Alces, supra note 40, at 244.
51. CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 30 (stating how operating agreements may “impose
fiduciary duties on members who might not otherwise have them”).
52. Alces, supra note 40, at 241.
53. See Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law:
Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 564 (2012).
54. Miller, supra note 15, at 569.
55. Alces, supra note 40, at 249.
56. See id. at 247.
57. Id. at 251.
58. Id.
59. See supra Section II.A.
60. CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 30.
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duties are defined in each state’s LLC act.61 Each state’s LLC statute describes
whether fiduciary duties are mandatory or default provisions.62 If fiduciary
duties are default provisions, they may be contractually altered or even
eliminated (in certain states) through the operating agreement.63 However,
many state statutes provide unclear language regarding which fiduciary duties
are owed, and others are completely silent.64 Legal uncertainty also adds cost
by complicating business planning, promoting costly litigation, and impeding
managerial discretion.65 This creates uncertainty for individuals desiring to
form an LLC,66 and may cause them to consider organizing their business in a
state where fiduciary duties are established. The absence of an explicit court
holding regarding the waiver of fiduciary duties, as well as what fiduciary
duties are owed when the statute is silent, will “add costs and inefficiencies to
an LLC and its operations.”67
III. APPLICABLE LLC METHODS
States approach the uncertainty surrounding default fiduciary duties and the
waiver of fiduciary duties in a variety of ways. Several states adopted the
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA), which provides
that members of an LLC owe the duty of care and loyalty as a default, which
cannot be contractually altered in the operating agreement.68 A majority of
states, however, adopted the Delaware method.69 In the Delaware method,
managers likely owe default fiduciary duties when the operating agreement is
silent,70 but can certainly eliminate fiduciary duties through the operating

61. See Miller, supra note 15, at 568.
62. See id.
63. See Pace, supra note 1, at 1092–94.
64. See id. at 1094–1113.
65. Paul M. Altman, et al., Eliminating Fiduciary Duty Uncertainty: The Benefits of Effectively
Modifying Fiduciary Duties in Delaware LLC Agreements, BUSINESS LAW TODAY (February 2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2013/02/05_altman.html
[https://perma.cc/3WQ2D4S8].
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. See Campbell, supra note 4, at 32.
69. Pace, supra note 1, at 1092 n.46 (noting that Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin follow the Delaware approach).
70. Feeley v. NHAOCG, L.L.C., 62 A.3d 649, 659, 663 (Del. Ch. 2012); Altman et al., supra
note 65.
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agreement.71 In Delaware, the lower Court of Chancery initially held that
managers owe default duties of loyalty and care when the operating agreement
is silent concerning the existence of such duties.72 The Supreme Court of
Delaware, however, disagreed with the lower court, taking no position on
whether default fiduciary duties are owed.73 Further, the Delaware legislature
enacted a new statute, which only clouded Delaware’s stance on default
fiduciary duties.74 Additionally, Delaware allows for the complete elimination
of all fiduciary duties in the operating agreement, but requires that members or
managers act in good faith.75 States that have adopted these methods partially
cured the default fiduciary duty and waiver dilemma; however, many states
(including Wisconsin) have not taken such action.76
A. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) created the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) in
1994 to try and articulate a singular entity form that could be adopted by all
fifty states.77 The NCCUSL felt that a uniform LLC statute provided fairness
and ease of formation for individuals desiring to form LLCs.78 Just two years

71. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2017); Altman et al., supra note 65.
72. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., L.L.C., 40 A.3d 839, 851 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff’d, 59
A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012).
73. Altman et al., supra note 65.
74. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104 (2017).
75. Id. § 18-1101(c).
76. Pace, supra note 1, at 1098–1108. Georgia addressed and accepted the enforceability of
fiduciary waivers. Stoker v. Bellemeade, L.L.C., 615 S.E.2d 1, 10 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d in part
on other grounds, 631 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 2006); Ledford v. Smith, 618 S.E.2d 627, 636 (Ga. Ct. App.
2005). North Carolina likewise looked at and enforced the waiver of fiduciary duties in Kaplan v. O.K.
Technologies, L.L.C., 675 S.E.2d 133, 137, 140 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). Massachusetts courts waver on
their implementation of the waiver of fiduciary duties, however, in Pointer v. Castellani, the highest
court in Massachusetts enforced the waiver of fiduciary duties. 918 N.E.2d 805, 810 (Mass. 2009).
Kansas courts have discussed but have yet to come to a conclusion on the issue of fiduciary waivers,
even though the surrounding federal courts have enforced the waiver of fiduciary duties. See Pace,
supra note 1, at 1101–02. While no Nevada case enforces the waiver, the Nevada LLC Act imitates
that of Delaware by allowing for contractual elimination of fiduciary duties. Id. at 1108–09.
77. Nicholas G. Karambelas, Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, WASH. LAW.
(Feb. 2008), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/february2008-llc-act.cfm [https://perma.cc/8P54-P4TJ].
78. See generally Uniform Law Commission, Why Your State Should Adopt the Uniform Limited
Liability
Company
Act
(ULLCA)
(2006)
(Last
Amended
2013),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability%20company/ULLCA%20-

BRUNK - MULR VOL. 101%2C NO. 3 (REVISED 5.18.18).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

872

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

5/19/18 9:37 AM

[101:863

later, in 1996, the ULLCA was revised to take into account the recently adopted
“check-the-box” federal tax regulation for LLCs.79 This regulation allowed
members of LLCs to decide if they would be taxed as a partnership, creating
the national LLC boom.80 Through the 1996 amendment, only five states
adopted the ULLCA.81 By 1997 LLCs became increasingly popular amongst
states, but, as little law existed on LLCs, states individually patched their
statutes as issues developped.82 As states individually patched their LLC
statutes and LLCs became more popular, a lack of uniformity arose between
the statutes.83
As the uniformity gaps widened, the NCCUSL resolved to examine and
package together the best practices and innovations among the states to create
a superior uniform LLC act.84 The Revised Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act (RULLCA) resulted from these examinations and innovations,
in 2006.85 The drafters of RULLCA made the most significant revisions in
several areas, such as: (1) the operating agreement; (2) fiduciary duties; (3)
indemnification; (4) initially forming an LLC without a member; (5) the rights
of oppressed minority members; (6) default rules on management structure; and
(7) creditor charging orders. 86 As of the most recent publication in 2013, a total
of eighteen jurisdictions adopted RULLCA.87
%20Why%20Your%20State%20Should%20Adopt.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7BQ-7L68] (last visited
Dec. 28, 2017) [hereinafter Why Your State Should Adopt].
79. Id.
80. Karambelas, supra note 77.
81. Uniform Law Commission, Legislative Enactment Status: Limited Liability Company (1995)
(1996),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeMap.aspx?title=Limited%20Liability%20Company%20(199
5)(1996) [https://perma.cc/T2XY-GM6M] (last visited Dec. 28, 2017). The states that adopted the
ULLCA were Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois, Montana, and South Dakota. Id.
82. Karambelas, supra note 77.
83. See Larry E. Ribstein, An Analysis of the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 3
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 35, 36–37 (2008); see also Charles W. Murdock, Limited Liability Companies in
the Decade of the 1990s: Legislative and Case Law Developments and Their Implications for the
Future, 56 BUS. LAW. 499, 500–01 (2001).
84. Ribstein, supra note 83, at 36–37.
85. Id. at 36; REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 101 (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2006) [hereinafter RULLCA].
86. Ribstein, supra note 83, at 39.
87. Uniform Law Commission, Legislative Fact Sheet – Limited Liability Company (2006) (Last
Amended
2013),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Limited%20Liability%20Company%2
0(2006)%20(Last%20Amended%202013) [https://perma.cc/5YZD-598V] (last visited Dec. 30, 2017).
The jurisdictions that have enacted RULLCA include the following: Alabama, California, Connecticut,
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The operating agreement and fiduciary duty revisions are most significant
in RULLCA. RULLCA states that an operating agreement may be oral, written,
or implied,88 as opposed to the strict written requirement found in several state
statutes.89 This change allows for greater freedom to contract while creating
the operating agreement, lowering transaction costs because the operating
agreement can be created electronically.90 Further, RULLCA governs any
matter not addressed in the operating agreement.91 In other words, when a state
adopts RULLCA and “the members have not agreed on an issue, then the
RULLCA governs any such issue.”92 RULLCA provides several defaults,
absent contractual alteration.93 RULLCA states, in the absence of contractual
alteration, that an LLC is a member-managed entity and provides the default
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, as well as the contractual promise of good
faith and fair dealing.94
In respect to the waiver of fiduciary duties, RULLCA states that members
may alter, but not eliminate, certain duties.95 This mandatory list includes the
duty of loyalty and care, as well as the contractual obligation of good faith and
fair dealing.96 Preventing the elimination of any of these fiduciary duties
heightens the fiduciary duty standard above that found in most state statutes.97
However, raising default duties diminishes parties’ ability to contract because
fewer terms can be contracted for. Not allowing parties to contractually alter
every provision may lower the initial contracting cost, but could deter potential
members who desire full contractual freedom.

District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
88. RULLCA § 102(13).
89. Karambelas, supra note 77. The District of Columbia, Minnesota, and Wisconsin LLC Acts
all require the operating agreement to be in writing. Id.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Why Your State Should Adopt, supra note 78.
94. Id.
95. RULLCA § 110.
96. Id. § 110(c)(4)–(5).
97. Pace, supra note 1, at 1093 & n.54 (listing twenty-four states that enacted statutory language
similar to the Delaware LLC Act, thus mandating fewer fiduciary duties than RULLCA).
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B. Delaware LLC Method
Numerous parties choose to form LLCs in Delaware because of the legal
benefits and “predictable business friendly laws.”98 These legal benefits and
business-friendly laws were put in place to encourage business formations,
often drawing businesses from other states. Currently, twenty-six states have
adopted the Delaware approach,99 making it the most common LLC formation
methodology in America.
Delaware’s LLC statute100 is the foundation of Delaware’s LLC law. The
primary focus of, and draw to, the Delaware LLC statute is total freedom of
contract.101 Delaware allows an individual’s duties to be expanded, restricted,
or even eliminated through the applicable operating agreement.102 The
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, however, may not be
eliminated.103 This covenant is not a fiduciary duty (as it is contractually
formed), but rather provides a pseudo-fiduciary duty. The total freedom to
contract allows members of an LLC to govern all relationships through
contract, often without requiring the traditional fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty.104 Additionally, the statute makes no distinction between membermanaged and manager-managed LLCs,105 so each action described in the statute
explicitly applies to both management structures. This alleviates some of the
ambiguity found in other state statutes, and eliminates uncertainty as to whether
different duties apply to the members or managers in the differing management
structures. Although the Delaware method is ambiguous on whether default
fiduciary duties are owed, it is in fact likely that these duties are owed.106
98. Delaware LLC, INCNOW, https://www.incnow.com/delaware-llc/ [https://perma.cc/J7K49TAT] (last visited January 15, 2017).
99. Pace, supra note 1, at 1092–93, 1112 (categorizing, under the Delaware approach, the
following states: Alabama, Arkansas, California (until 2015), Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin).
100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101 (2017).
101. Altman et al., supra note 65.
102. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (“[T]he member’s or manager’s or other person’s
duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited liability company
agreement.”).
103. Id. (“[T]he limited liability company agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”).
104. Altman et al., supra note 65.
105. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c)–(d).
106. See infra Section III.B.2.
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1. Delaware’s contractual waiver of duties
Contracting out of duties is important and often useful. In the present day
individuals often engage in more than one business venture, and this action can
prove hairy without waiving the duty of loyalty.107 Without such waiver,
members or managers of an LLC may be unable to fully participate in multiple
businesses without violating the duty of loyalty.108 Allowing members to define
their own duties and expectations not only provides for greater participation,
but protects members through the narrowly defined expectations created by the
parties themselves.109 Moreover, contracting parties eliminate the uncertainty
that arises from unclear LLC statutory language.110 Creating certainty among
the parties reduces costs when negotiating a contract and in potential
litigation,111 which is a benefit for any business entity. Statistics show that
allowing for complete contractual elimination of duties, like in Delaware,
increases the value of LLCs.112
Delaware recognized the changing structure of LLCs from privately held to
publicly held entities, and shifted its policy to address this change.113 In
addition, the amount of investment in publicly held LLCs outpaced traditional
investments by three times over the past ten years.114 The contractual alteration
and elimination of duties allows Delaware public LLCs to broadly appeal to
investors.115 This waiver of fiduciary duties allows for LLCs to “raise capital,
build efficient investor bases, and secure optimal management
arrangements.”116 While the waiver of fiduciary duties may eliminate
protections that investors desire,117 carefully reading the operating agreement
provides certainty as to what duties are owed to investors. Therefore, investors
are certain of the duties owed to them, even if they do not receive all desired

107. See Pace, supra note 1, at 1090.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. Altman et al., supra note 65.
111. Pace, supra note 1, at 1088.
112. See Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 49, at 1121 (showing that public LLCs realized an
average positive stock return of one or one and a half percent in Delaware).
113. See Eisenhofer & Moyna, supra note 21.
114. Id.
115. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 49, at 1079 (“Public companies have an enormous appetite
for tailoring the duty of loyalty when freed to do so.”).
116. Id.
117. See Eisenhofer & Moyna, supra note 21.
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fiduciary duty protections and can make an informed business decision whether
to invest.
In order for the waiver of fiduciary duties to prove effective, certainty must
exist that the waiver will be enforced.118 Delaware courts addressed the
enforceability of a waiver of fiduciary duties more than any other state court
system and upheld the enforceability of such waivers.119 The most indicative
case showing Delaware courts’ acceptance of the waiver of fiduciary duties is
Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal.120
In Fisk, two doctors created a biomedical technology company, Gentrix, as
an LLC.121 When financing ran tight for the company, one of the doctors sought
to acquire further capital through investors, and the other doctor refused to
allow such action.122 The refusing doctor sought to dissolve the company, and
the other doctor brought claims against him for breach of contract and breach
of fiduciary duties.123 The court, in deciding upon these claims, held that LLCs
in Delaware “are creatures not of the state but of contract” and any duties or
obligations must exist in the LLC’s operating agreement or other enforceable
contract.124 However, neither of the doctors owed any fiduciary duties to the
other, as all fiduciary duties were waived in Gentrix’s operating agreement.125
The court ruled that because no fiduciary duties were expressly set forth in the
operating agreement, no fiduciary duties existed between the parties; therefore,
no breach of fiduciary duty could exist.126 Thus, Delaware courts permit the
waiver of any fiduciary duties in LLCs.
2. Delaware’s ambiguous default duties
While the waiver of fiduciary duties is clearly articulated in Delaware, the
state failed to synthesize an unambiguous rule for default fiduciary duties.127
The question of what default fiduciary duties were owed by LLC members was
118. See Pace, supra note 1, at 1112–13.
119. Id. at 1095 & n.64.
120. See No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008).
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id. at *3–4.
123. Id. at *6.
124. Id. at *8.
125. Id at *9 (“No Member shall have any duty to any Member of the Company except as
expressly set forth herein or in other written agreements.”).
126. Id. at *11–12.
127. Mohsen Manesh, Damning Dictum: The Default Duty Debate in Delaware, 39 J. CORP. L.
35, 41–42 (2013) [hereinafter Dictum].
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clear in Delaware until 2012, when the Delaware Supreme Court cast doubt
upon the issue in Gatz Properties v. Auriga Capital Corp.128 The Delaware
General Assembly attempted to resolve the default duty question, but only
offered ambiguous legislation.129
In Gatz, the Delaware Supreme Court disagreed with, and seemed to scorn,
the Court of Chancery’s holding that parties to LLCs owe default fiduciary
duties.130 The defendant in Gatz sought to eliminate the minority investors of
an LLC, of which the defendant was the sole manager.131 To accomplish this
goal, the manager-defendant forced the LLC to undertake a squeeze-out merger
under false pretenses, leaving minority members and investors with no return
on their investment.132 The minority members and investors promptly sued the
manager-defendant under both breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract
claims.133 The court looked to the operating agreement, which did not explicitly
eliminate the fiduciary duties.134 The chancellor found that absent the
contractual elimination of fiduciary duties, the common law fiduciary duties
apply as a default.135
Gatz Properties, Inc. then appealed this case to the Delaware Supreme
Court.136 The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed with the chancellor’s finding
that default fiduciary duties are owed in the absence of contractual alteration,
holding that the LLC statute was ambiguous.137 Following the court’s lead in
Gatz Properties, LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., the Delaware legislature
amended its LLC statute in the “2013 amendment.”138 This amendment
attempted to confirm the existence of default common law fiduciary
obligations.139 Instead, the amendment only stated that fiduciary duties may be
eliminated, implying that default fiduciary duties exist.140 Thus, the

128. See generally 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012); see also Dictum, supra note 127, at 37–38.
129. Dictum, supra note 127, at 67–70.
130. Gatz, 59 A.3d at 1218–20.
131. Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., L.L.C., 40 A.3d 839, 841–44 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff’d,
59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012).
132. See id. at 842–43.
133. Id. at 848.
134. Id. at 849–52.
135. Id. at 849–56.
136. See Gatz Props., L.L.C. v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012).
137. Id. at 1219.
138. Dictum, supra note 127, at 38–39; H.R. 126, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013).
139. H.R. 126, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013).
140. Dictum, supra note 127, at 67–68.
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amendment to the LLC statute only offered further ambiguity on the subject, as
no default fiduciary duties were explicitly provided for.
Delaware, through its courts and legislature, created an attractive
environment in which to form an LLC by eliminating uncertainty for potential
LLC members.141 It did so by creating a system that allows for the waiver of
all fiduciary duties, but harmed itself by failing to clarify whether default
fiduciary duties are owed in an LLC.
C. Wisconsin’s Adoption of LLCs
Since Wisconsin’s adoption of the LLC business model in 1994, LLCs have
surpassed all other business formations in the state.142 From 2011–2016, LLCs
accounted for over eighty-four percent of all new business entity filings each
year.143 This easily makes LLCs the most popular business model in
Wisconsin. Before discussing the present state of Wisconsin’s LLC law and its
impact, the law’s history must be delved into.
The history of LLCs in Wisconsin began January 1, 1994, with the passing
of the 1993 Wisconsin Act 112 (the Wisconsin LLC Act).144 The Wisconsin
LLC Act provides the governing LLC statute for Wisconsin, laying out the
fiduciary duties that members and managers owe if not contractually altered in
141. See supra Section III.B.
142. Joseph W. Boucher & George R. Kamperschroer, The First LLC Case, WIS. LAW., Sept.
2005, at 13.
143. 2016
Compilation
of
Filings,
WIS.
DEP’T
OF
FIN.
INSTITUTIONS,
https://www.wdfi.org/_resources/indexed/site/corporations/HistoricalStatistics/CompilationOfFilings
/2016MostRecent.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SK4-2XVP] (last updated Jan. 11, 2017); 2015 Compilation
of
Filings,
WIS.
DEP’T
OF
FIN.
INSTITUTIONS,
https://www.wdfi.org/_resources/indexed/site/corporations/HistoricalStatistics/CompilationOfFilings
/Jan2Dec2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/EXZ4-LR7E] (last updated Jan. 13, 2016); 2014 Compilation of
Filings,
WIS.
DEP’T
OF
F IN.
INSTITUTIONS,
https://www.wdfi.org/_resources/indexed/site/corporations/HistoricalStatistics/CompilationOfFilings
/Jan2Dec2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/N944-AJX2] (last updated Jan. 7, 2015); 2013 Compilation of
Filings,
WIS.
DEP’T
OF
F IN.
INSTITUTIONS,
https://www.wdfi.org/_resources/indexed/site/corporations/HistoricalStatistics/CompilationOfFilings
/Jan2Dec2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/UVK9-97GE] (last updated Jan. 7, 2014); 2012 Compilation of
Filings,
WIS.
DEP’T
OF
F IN.
INSTITUTIONS,
https://www.wdfi.org/_resources/indexed/site/corporations/HistoricalStatistics/CompilationOfFilings
/Jan2Dec2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC5C-VPZS] (last updated Jan. 7, 2013); 2011 Compilation of
Filings,
WIS.
DEP’T
OF
F IN.
INSTITUTIONS,
https://www.wdfi.org/_resources/indexed/site/corporations/HistoricalStatistics/CompilationOfFilings
/Jan2Dec2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2GT-2B8C] (last updated Jan. 6, 2012).
144. 12 ROBERT A. PASCH, WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES: WISCONSIN COLLECTION LAW §
20:12 (2d ed. 2006).
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the operating agreement.145 The drafters’ goal in creating the Wisconsin LLC
Act was to provide limited liability, pass-through taxation, and simplicity to
individuals to attract business formations in Wisconsin.146 In order to
accomplish these goals the drafters emphasized the importance of flexibility
and freedom to contract,147 concepts which exist in Wisconsin’s current LLC
Act.148
The Wisconsin LLC Act provides several default duties that may be
contractually altered through the operating agreement.149 First, the Wisconsin
LLC Act states that members and managers have a duty to not act with a willful
failure to deal fairly with the LLC or members if the member or manager in
connection with the matter has a material conflict of interest.150 Members or
managers may deal with parties on a matter in which they have a material
conflict of interest, so long as they do so fairly.151 Second, in a Wisconsin LLC
a party cannot violate criminal law unless the individual had reasonable cause
to believe that the conduct was lawful.152 Third, the Wisconsin LLC Act
provides that a member or manager shall not engage in a “transaction from
which the member or manager derived an improper personal profit.”153 Fourth
and finally, the Wisconsin LLC Act forbids a member or manager to act in a
manner that constitutes willful misconduct against the LLC or other
members.154 The preceding provisions seemingly create the default duty of
loyalty for LLC members or managers, but, without explicit language,
individuals cannot be certain. The same statute holds that these duties may be
waived by the parties,155 ensuring that contractual freedom exists in Wisconsin.

145. WIS. STAT. § 183.0402(1) (2015–2016).
146. Gottsacker v. Monnier, 2005 WI 69, ¶ 19, 281 Wis. 2d 361, 697 N.W.2d 436 (citing JOSEPH
W. BOUCHER ET AL., LLCS AND LLPS: A WISCONSIN HANDBOOK, at v (rev. ed. 1999)).
147. Id.
148. WIS. STAT. § 183.0402 (2015–2016) (allowing for contractual alteration in the operating
agreement).
149. See id.
150. Id. at § 183.0402(1)(a). Parties are said to have a material conflict of interest in a business
dealing when they derive personal profit from a dealing, at the expense of the company. See id.
§ 183.0402(2).
151. Id. § 183.0402(1)(a).
152. Id. § 183.0402(1)(b).
153. Id. § 183.0402(1)(c).
154. Id. § 183.0402(1)(d).
155. See id. § 183.0402.
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1. Waiver of fiduciary duties
While fiduciary duties are statutorily provided, they may be waived through
the operating agreement if the state permits. Through an operating agreement,
the Wisconsin LLC Act states that a member of an LLC can alter virtually every
duty for members and managers, giving incredible flexibility to LLC
formation.156 Thus, Wisconsin adopted the waiver standard found in the
Delaware LLC Act,157 but failed to take additional business-friendly actions
that make Delaware such an attractive state for LLC formations.158
In Wisconsin, however, the courts have not yet addressed whether the
waiver of fiduciary duties is enforceable.159 This creates a tremendous amount
of uncertainty for parties wishing to form an LLC, and for parties desiring to
modify or even eliminate fiduciary duties of an LLC.160 While the statute’s
language appears to permit all waivers,161 parties may have to spend additional
time and resources predicting and defining the specifics of each duty. Even
with these duties defined clearly in the operating agreement, parties may
experience additional litigation costs.162 Such uncertainty and the resulting
increase in cost could drive potential LLC formations out of Wisconsin, to more
business-friendly states like Delaware.
2. Default common law fiduciary duties in Wisconsin
Not only have the Wisconsin courts not addressed the enforceability of
waivers, they also have failed to explicitly state whether default common law
fiduciary duties are owed by LLC members. The Wisconsin LLC Act
ambiguously provides that members and managers owe the fiduciary duty of
loyalty163—one of the “common law” fiduciary duties that courts apply to both

156. See id.
157. Pace, supra note 1, at 1093 & n.54, 1112.
158. Delaware’s courts upheld the waiver of fiduciary duties and implementation of common
law fiduciary duties absent contractual language. See supra Section III.B.
159. Pace, supra note 1, at 1112 & n.227 (noting that Wisconsin is one of fourteen states allowing
waivers, but has no existing case law establishing the enforceability of such waivers).
160. Id. at 1112–13.
161. WIS. STAT. § 183.0402 (referring to the phrase, “Unless otherwise provided in an operating
agreement[,]” which seemingly permits any waiver of fiduciary duty).
162. Litigation is likely because no precedent exists on the issue.
163. See supra Section III.C.
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corporations and partnerships.164 The Wisconsin LLC Act, however, does not
speak to the additional common law fiduciary duties,165 which often apply to
LLCs in other states. The common law fiduciary duties often include the duty
of loyalty and the duty of care,166 leaving Wisconsin LLC members without the
duty of care. Wisconsin courts considered this issue twice but did not publish
an applicable ruling.167
LLC case law in Wisconsin began in 2005 with Gottsacker v. Monnier.168
In Gottsacker, the court sought to determine whether Mr. Monnier, a member
of the LLC, breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty when he sold company
property and received large personal benefits.169 The plaintiffs, members of the
LLC, offered that Mr. Monnier had a material conflict of interest in the
transaction, which prevented him from dealing in the transaction fairly.170 The
court held that it could not determine whether Mr. Monnier engaged in the
transaction fairly, because the appellate court incorrectly determined that the
transaction was unfair.171 Thus, the court reversed the decision of the court of
appeals and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further ruling.172 In
doing so, the court failed to address whether the duty of loyalty was strictly
upheld or if LLC members and managers must only deal fairly with the other
members.173
While this case holding illuminates the deflection by Wisconsin courts of
LLC fiduciary duty cases, the concurring opinion written by Justice
Roggensack provides the first fiduciary ambiguity in Wisconsin.174 Justice
Roggensack determined that the rights and obligations of members and
managers are set solely by the Wisconsin LLC Act.175 She further stated that
the “[c]ommon law concepts such as the fiduciary duty of a majority
164. See, e.g., Exec. Ctr. III, L.L.C. v. Meieran, 823 F. Supp. 2d 883, 890–891 (E.D. Wis. 2011);
Gottsacker v. Monnier, 2005 WI 69, ¶ 14, 281 Wis. 2d 361, 697 N.W.2d 436 (citing JOSEPH W.
BOUCHER ET AL., LLCS AND LLPS: A WISCONSIN HANDBOOK § 1.4 (rev. ed. 1999)).
165. See WIS. STAT. § 183.0402 (referring only to the fiduciary duty of loyalty).
166. See Alces, supra note 40, at 249–52.
167. Gottsacker, 2005 WI 69; Exec. Ctr. III, L.L.C., 823 F. Supp. 2d 883.
168. 2005 WI 69, ¶ 13.
169. Id. ¶¶ 2, 7–9.
170. Id. ¶¶ 9–10.
171. Id. ¶ 35. Appellate courts may not determine factual issues. Id. That job is reserved for
the circuit court in Wisconsin. See id.
172. Id. ¶ 37.
173. See id.
174. Id. ¶ 38–57 (Roggensack, J., concurring).
175. Id. ¶¶ 45, 48.
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shareholder of a corporation to a minority shareholder are replaced by statutory
obligations.”176 These statements, while made in a concurring opinion, created
great ambiguity as to whether members and managers of a Wisconsin LLC owe
common law fiduciary duties. This uncertainty would not be revisited until six
years later in Executive Center III, L.L.C. v. Meieran.177
The Executive Center case centered on a dispute between a member of the
BRIC Executive, LLC, Andrew Meieran, and the Executive Center leaseback
company.178 When the BRIC LLC approached numerous investors about
selling a small portion of BRIC’s membership, one of the executive members,
Meieran, chose to invest in the hope of reviving the dying company.179 The
company eventually filed for bankruptcy and sold off its office building, using
some of its proceeds from the sale to satisfy the debt with Meieran.180 This
created an issue, as Meieran was an executive of the company and should have
owed fiduciary duties. Executive Center sued Meieran, alleging that he violated
the common law fiduciary duties owed to the leaseback company.181 Meieran
argued that common law fiduciary duties do not apply to members of an LLC
under Wisconsin law, relying primarily on the concurring opinion of Judge
Roggensack in Gottsacker.182 The court disagreed, holding that common law
fiduciary duties apply to Wisconsin LLCs183 and refused to grant summary
judgment to Meieran.184 Further, the court reasoned that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s holding in Gottsacker did not include Judge Roggensack’s
statement because it was made in a concurring opinion.185
While the Executive Center case should have ended the debate as to whether
common law fiduciary duties apply to Wisconsin LLCs, it failed to do so.186
Since Executive Center is a federal case, its holding does not bind Wisconsin’s

176. Id. ¶ 45 (construing WIS. STAT. §§ 183.0402, 183.1302(3) (2003–2004)).
177. Exec. Ctr. III, L.L.C. v. Meieran, 823 F. Supp. 2d 883 (E.D. Wis. 2011).
178. See id. at 884.
179. Id. at 885–86.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 887.
182. See id. at 890; Gottsacker v. Monnier, 2005 WI 69, 281 Wis. 2d 361, 697 N.W.2d 436
(Roggensack, J., concurring).
183. Exec. Ctr. III, L.L.C., 823 F. Supp. at 890–92.
184. Id. at 892.
185. Id. at 891.
186. Willenbrink, supra note 6, at 29 (stating that federal court decisions are not binding on
Wisconsin’s state courts, and further, the case was settled, which deprived the Seventh Circuit the
opportunity to refer the case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court).
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state courts.187 Further, the case ended in a settlement, depriving the circuit
court the opportunity to refer the case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.188
Thus, the question of whether common law fiduciary duties apply to LLCs in
Wisconsin remains unanswered, allowing uncertainty to persist.
IV. INCREASING THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF WISCONSIN LLCS
While LLC formations increased in Wisconsin over the past five years, the
Wisconsin legislature should create and enact a new LLC statute to increase
investor confidence and draw LLC formations to Wisconsin. The current
Wisconsin LLC Act and related court holdings create uncertainty regarding
fiduciary duties.189 This uncertainty is shaped by unclear statutory language
and inconsistent decisions in Wisconsin’s courts regarding the waiver of duties
and applicable default fiduciary duties.190
When uncertainty exists in a particular state due to unclear or confusing
regulation, parties are less likely to form an LLC in that state and costs rise for
all parties involved.191 This rise in cost is most often felt in the initial
contracting due to high information costs,192 but may also arise in resulting
transactions. Contracting costs rise because extensive amounts of time will be
taken to clarify the uncertainty regarding the waiver of fiduciary duties, as well
as the implementation of default common law fiduciary duties.193 Additionally,
these problems increase costs due to future litigation costs.194 The resulting
negative impact of these costs and complications may have steered LLC
formations to other states or decreased investment potential in Wisconsin LLCs.
In order to cure these issues and increase LLC formations in Wisconsin, the
Wisconsin legislature should enact a new LLC statute that explicitly provides
for the default duties of loyalty and care, while permitting the waiver of these
fiduciary duties.
Were Wisconsin to adopt RULLCA, it would yield a positive impact on
LLC formations and investment in the state but would not create the greatest
187. Id.
188. Order Dismissing Action, Exec. Ctr. III, L.L.C. v. Meieran, No. 10-CV-263-JPS (E.D. Wis.
Feb. 3, 2012).
189. See supra Section III.C.
190. See supra Section III.C.
191. See generally Altman et al., supra note 65.
192. Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
457, 497 (2009).
193. See Altman et al., supra note 65.
194. Pace, supra note 1, at 1088.
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positive impact. Adopting RULLCA would prove beneficial by eliminating the
uncertainties surrounding fiduciary duties in Wisconsin.
However,
implementing RULLCA would not best serve Wisconsin. RULLCA prohibits
the contractual elimination of fiduciary duties,195 eradicating the total freedom
of contract that parties desire.196 While the adoption of RULLCA would
provide a one-stop shop for the legislature (as it could adopt the entire act), the
benefits found from enacting a new statute cannot be outweighed by the
simplicity of adopting RULLCA. Further, Wisconsin attorneys proposed an
overhaul of the Wisconsin LLC Act and adoption of RULLCA in 2013.197 This
proposed overhaul has yet to occur in over four years, leading to the belief that
a different approach would better serve Wisconsin.
While Wisconsin’s LLC statute permits the waiver of fiduciary duties,
similar to the Delaware method,198 it should not adopt the language of
Delaware’s LLC Act and the surrounding provisions. The certainty
surrounding Delaware LLC’s ability to eliminate fiduciary duties would
decrease costs and attract more LLC formations, but Delaware fails to provide
default fiduciary duties for LLCs.199 Without the imposition of default
fiduciary duties on LLCs, “unscrupulous businesspeople may legally use the
LLC form to operate in a dishonest manner.”200 Further, it would take years for
the necessary court decisions to exist in order to provide the business-friendly
environment found in Delaware.
To provide certainty for potential LLC members and investors, the
Wisconsin legislature should create a new LLC statute. Instead of allowing
courts to impose default fiduciary duties and uphold waivers, the Wisconsin
legislature should proactively create a new LLC statute because the court
system is largely reactionary. This statute would impose clear statutory
language allowing for the waiver of fiduciary duties and implementing common
law fiduciary duties in the absence of conflicting language in the operating
agreement. While the Wisconsin LLC Act ambiguously states that the duty of

195. RULLCA § 110(c)(4) (2006).
196. See Gottsacker v. Monnier, 2005 WI 69, ¶ 19, 281 Wis. 2d 361, 697 N.W.2d 436 (citing
JOSEPH W. BOUCHER ET AL., LLCS AND LLPS: A WISCONSIN HANDBOOK § 1.11 (rev. ed. 1999)).
197. Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act: A Proposal for Wisconsin, WISBAR (Aug.
21,
2013),
https://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/insidetrack/pages/article.aspx?volume=5&issue=16&articl
eid=10981 [https://perma.cc/YP52-4JVV].
198. WIS. STAT. § 183.0402 (2015–2016); Pace, supra note 1, at 1092–95.
199. See supra Section III.B.2.
200. Willenbrink, supra note 6, at 30.
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loyalty is provided, the duty of care is absent.201 Rectifying this issue, the new
statute would explicitly provide for the default duties of loyalty and care for
LLC members and managers. This new statute aligns with the Seventh
Circuit’s holding in Executive Center that common law fiduciary duties apply
to LLCs in Wisconsin, which had no authority over Wisconsin state courts.
This case demonstrated that the court, albeit a federal court, in Wisconsin
believes that common law fiduciary duties should apply.202
Wisconsin could thus eliminate ambiguity regarding the waiver of fiduciary
duties and imposition of default fiduciary duties in LLCs. This action will
create a two-part balanced statute that eliminates the uncertainty that currently
persists under the Wisconsin LLC Act and surrounding case law. Such action
would provide potential investors and members with the confidence they desire,
attracting additional LLC formations and increasing investment in Wisconsin
LLCs.
Critics, traditionalists, and Wisconsin attorneys in favor of adopting
RULLCA would likely argue that minority shareholders are not offered
adequate protection due to the ability to waive all fiduciary duties. The debate
regarding adequate minority shareholder protections surrounded Delaware
LLCs for years between the traditionalists and contractarians,203 because, in
theory, an LLC could eliminate all fiduciary duties that protect minority
shareholder interests.204 Traditionalists argue that social values of fairness and
trust are substituted for efficiency when LLCs are permitted to waive fiduciary
duties.205 These scholars, in part, fail to recognize parties’ ability to adequately
contract, which enables parties to implement adequate protections and realize
efficiencies. Contractarians embrace the viewpoint that parties should be
allowed to contractually eliminate fiduciary duties, as the social benefits
suggested by the traditionalists come at a cost that often outweighs the

201. See WIS. STAT. § 183.0402 (2015–2016).
202. See supra Section III.C.
203. See Manesh, supra note 53, at 562–66.
204. Keith H. Berk & George J. Spathis, Understanding Fiduciary Obligations Applicable to
Delaware
Limited
Liability
Companies,
PRAC.
LAW.,
Dec.
2012,
at
31,
http://www.hmblaw.com/media/71174/understanding_fiduciary_obligations__the_practical_lawyer.p
df [https://perma.cc/T6BT-JX7K].
205. J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, Contractarianism and Its Discontents: Reflections
on Unincorporated Business Organization Law Reform, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 493, 498, 500–01
(2009).
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protective benefits.206 This contractarian view has guided LLC reform over the
past two decades,207 and drives LLC formations to Delaware where parties
freely waive fiduciary duties.208 Further, the waiver of fiduciary duties should
exist as a business decision that either attracts or deters investment.
V. CONCLUSION
The current Wisconsin LLC Act and the supporting case law present an
unclear position regarding whether parties owe common law fiduciary duties,
and if these duties may be contractually waived. Wisconsin’s courts have had
twenty-two years to rectify this situation but have failed to do so. Allowing
such uncertainty to persist has diminished formation of, and investment in,
Wisconsin LLCs. Thus, the task of eliminating these concerns falls to the
legislature. The Wisconsin legislature should create and enact a new Wisconsin
LLC Act that clearly provides for the waiver of fiduciary duties, and the
imposition of the common law fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.
Additionally, the new Wisconsin LLC Act would provide additional
protections, such as the contractual requirement of good faith and fair dealing,
as well as other protections not contemplated in this Comment. By following
these steps Wisconsin will increase the attractiveness of forming an LLC in the
state, which will increase the amount of LLC formations and investment in
LLCs within Wisconsin.
COLLIN D. BRUNK*

206. See Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 537, 559 (1997) (stating that noneconomic, or social values “impose real costs on society
without commensurate benefits”).
207. Callison & Vestal, supra note 205, at 501–02.
208. Manesh, supra note 53, at 573.
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